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Abstract 
 The general topic of this paper is causality, or the metaphysical relationship between 
causes and effects. More specifically, I am writing about retrocausation – the occurrence of 
effects before their causes – and some related contemporary arguments. The first section 
covers topics in the philosophy of time, with special consideration being paid to the temporal 
relations between events. It is here that I defend the view of time called Growing Block Theory. 
The second section is about some arguments concerning the logical possibility of effects 
preceding their causes. After briefly explicating some arguments for and against such a 
possibility I critique a particularly strong argument against the logical possibility of 
retrocausation from causal loops and find it wanting. The third section is an account of some 
psychological experiments that are supposed to show that a type of retrocausation, namely 
precognition, has been demonstrated by research participants. I will explain some reasons why 
precognition is very probably not the appropriate explanation of the experimental results. The 
fourth section concludes this paper with a discussion about causal asymmetry, which could be a 
reason given for believing time is asymmetric. I claim that reality is underwritten by an 
objective causal asymmetry that is logically independent of the ways human beings cognize 
reality, but that is not to say retrocausation in a certain sense is necessarily impossible. It is 
because objective causal asymmetry is a contingent fact of reality that it is possible for effects 
to precede their causes insofar as temporally-opposite directed causal processes possibly 
occupy the same spatial region in at least some instances, given a causal analysis of time. 
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§1 Time 
I am beginning this paper with an analysis of time. Time is important to the discussion of 
retrocausation because an instance of retrocausation is an instance of an effect temporally 
preceding its cause. A discussion of retrocausation is almost pointless without first having a 
clear idea of temporal precedence – viz. what it means for one event to be earlier than another, 
or later than another. My goal in this part is to defend what metaphysicians call Growing Block 
Theory (GBT) of time. I will broadly outline three popular theories of time and give reasons why 
GBT is true. Arguments about the relations between retrocausation and time will be considered 
in the next section, after an adequate theory of time has been developed. Hence, this part of 
the paper will be the foundational base upon which I will build arguments in subsequent parts. 
Truthmakers  
The first problem I am addressing is that of defining the conditions needed to be met by 
a satisfactory account of time. A theory of time must be able to explain the fact that some 
things change over time. A theory that is internally consistent will be measured in its predictive 
power by the elegance of its true causal explanations. So a satisfactory account of time will 
explain change in causal terms. It is without question that change occurs. The weather at noon 
on Sunday, for example, may be quite different than the weather at noon on Monday. At noon 
on Monday, it would be true that the weather has changed sometime between then and now. 
This is so because of the relevant changes during the series of moments beginning at noon on 
Sunday and ending at noon on Monday. A satisfactory account of time should allow for an 
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elegant causal explanation for things like the changing of the weather from one day to the next. 
The more general the causal explanation, the more favorable the theory that predicted it is. 
The allowance of causal explanations is related to another condition needed to be met 
by a satisfactory account of time. Given the problem of explaining change, a satisfactory 
account of time must accurately describe truthmakers for ontologically grounded facts about, 
at the very least, some given moment. What is it, for example, that makes it true on July fourth 
the statement “today is the Fourth of July”? Craig Bourne, in A Future For Presentism, phrases 
this condition as “the three conditions that any satisfactory account of time should [meet]: it 
allows us to state truths about the past; it wears its ontological commitments on its sleeve; and 
it ensures that truth-value links are preserved” (2006, Pg. 65). These three conditions are 
constellated around the appropriate description of truthmakers for things like contingently 
necessary past facts, facts about temporal relations, general facts about later states of affairs, 
and causal explanations. It is widely agreed that it is a logically contingent fact that a past event 
E occurred. After E has occurred it is thereafter necessary, in a certain sense, since it is 
henceforth impossible for the proposition that E occurred to be false at any later time. The 
proposition that E occurred is accordingly described as contingently necessary. An example 
would be the statement “the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is true because Caesar did in 
fact cross the Rubicon in 49 BC and that event caused his crossing to be well-documented.” It is 
the contingent necessity of this dated fact, about a concretely realized event, that makes it now 
true that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. If it were not the case that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 
49 BC, or at any other moment, then it would now be false that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.  A 
lengthy discussion of truthmaker theories is not my aim in this paper. Nor is it my goal to 
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defend any explicit truthmaker theory. An account of time is satisfactory if it at the very least 
makes consistent claims about the ontology of truthmakers of this sort.  
The key features of this type of explanation could be that the change in question 1) 
presupposes the passage of time from one moment, now, to the next, or 2) appeals to intrinsic 
temporal relations between all moments that underwrite necessary facts about the happenings 
of all moments, or 3) requires the spontaneous creation of indexically dated facts that do not 
exist before now but are made true by some feature of reality. Combinations of options (1), (2), 
and (3) correspond to the terminology used by various tensed and tenseless theories of time. 
Time and change 
Sydney Shoemaker has argued, in Time Without Change, that time does not necessarily 
involve change (1969, Pg. 371).He makes reference to making an inference that time had 
elapsed during which no change occurs in any part of a cluster of regions in the same universe. 
We can think of his argument as depending on the logical possibility of a many-in-one causal 
system, the three spatio-temporal sections of which “freeze” and “unfreeze” all causal 
processes for the duration of exactly one year at regular intervals. Section A freezes every three 
years, B freezes every four years, and C freezes every five years. Because people living in one 
section would regularly observe the freezes occurring in one or two of the other sections, and 
could infer that their own section freezes by observing that other sections seem to “jump 
forward” at times during which their own section is frozen, it follows that they could infer that 
there is a temporal duration of one year out of every sixty in which no change occurs in all three 
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sections because there is a global freeze. This could be done by setting up clocks near the 
boundaries between sections and measuring the relevant rates of change, or lack thereof.  
This is different than a kind of change described by a tensed ontology of time. 
Shoemaker’s argument depends on extensive change rather than intensive change. Extensive 
change is change in the relational properties of objects, or the intrinsic non-temporal properties 
of events. Intensive change is a matter of change in an event’s relational temporal order in 
terms of the properties of pastness, presentness, or futurity. This contrast is important to the 
present discussion in the sense that the extensive change described by Shoemaker is not the 
same as the temporal properties of events changing over time. There has to be some additional 
fact, that brings about change in terms of the type of temporally “gappy” causality (processes 
with some duration between causes and effects) described by Shoemaker, which unfreezes 
everything, without itself changing, after a global freeze in order for the story to be consistent. 
 Tensed ontologies of time can reject the assumption that causes need not be 
temporally contiguous with their effects, as would have to be the case, to support the 
conclusion that temporal duration does not require change. Additionally, tensed theories of 
time assume that intensive change, like an events changing from being a present event to a 
past event due to the discrete passage of the present moment from one instant to the next, is 
not reducible to any kind of extensive change, or to permanent temporal relations like “being 
earlier than” or “being later than.” Because this paper is concerned with the problem of 
retrocausation, and the extensive change described by Shoemaker is possible only if there are 
no spatio-temporally contiguous causal connections capable of bringing about change for the 
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time during which sections are momentarily frozen, the following is important. First one must 
get clear about the importance of changing temporal properties – pastness, etc. Second, one 
must consider the possibility of an effect being temporally separated from its cause. 
McTaggart’s taxonomy 
 In The Unreality of Time, J.M.E. McTaggart introduces the notions of the A-series, B-
series, and the C-series as representations of the ways that events could be temporally 
arranged. The A-series consists of groups of past and future moments which are separated by 
the present moment. As time elapses, the analytically basic temporal properties of events 
change from being future to being present and finally to being past. The B-series consists in a 
group of moments which all stand in permanent temporal relations to each other. Accordingly, 
propositions about past and future events are reducible to earlier-than or later-then relations. 
The term “present moment” picks out a particular instant that is tenselessly temporally located 
later than some moments and earlier than others. Tenseless temporal locations are similar to 
the relational properties of integers along a number line, the statement “3 is less than 4” is 
tenselessly true regardless of what time it is. The C-series is a series of arbitrarily discrete 
moments. As there is no temporal direction, or intrinsically directional temporal properties, 
built in to the arbitrary series “A E Q B”, there is no temporal direction or intrinsically relational 
properties built in to the C-series. An example of a C-series description of time is the history of 
the world described strictly in terms of dates at which events occurred. It is not unless one can 
say something in addition to the date of a C-series timestamped event, like “is earlier than,” or 
“is currently present”, that the notion of temporal precedence is relevant. An example of doing 
so would be stating that the present year is 2013, and an earlier year is 2012. The goal of this 
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section is to give a tenseless description of time that appeals to the concepts of presentness, 
pastness, and the later-than relation. A discussion of the debate between tensed and tenseless 
accounts of time will be necessary, as is a brief discussion of precedence and causality. 
The tensed and tenseless time debate 
Many philosophers follow McTaggart’s lead in broadly distinguishing between A-type 
and B-type theories of time. A-type theories describe the ontology of time in terms of the 
present moment, or as a series of moments that tenselessly began in the past and includes all 
moments past, present, and future. The B-type theories describe the ontology of time in terms 
of facts about eternally fixed temporal relations which apply to a series of moments whose 
ontological status are always the same. The distinction between A- and B-type theories is based 
on whether a complete theory claims that time is basically tensed or tenseless.  
If time is basically tensed, then tensed temporal properties like past, present, and future 
are not reducible to tenseless temporal relations like “earlier than” and “later than”. Put in 
common terms, the sentence “the year 1922 occurred earlier than this current year” would be 
read “the year 1922 occurred earlier than the present”, where the term present refers to some 
special property that an event has only once – viz. when it is present, or not earlier or later than 
this very moment. The term “now”, on the tensed view, indexically refers to the instant of time 
that is ontologically distinct in the sense that we are immediately aware of this moment, right 
now, unlike any other. The key point of a tensed view of time is that the concepts of past, 
present, and future correspond to mutually exclusive tensed properties instantiated in events 
as time passes. An objection made by Michael Tooley (1997) to a strictly tensed view of time is 
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that the concept of the future, rather than being analytically basic, itself needs to be analyzed, 
to avoid circularity.  The natural way of doing that is in terms of the idea that the future is what 
is later than the present. If time is basically tenseless, then such tensed properties are reducible 
to tenseless relations. A B-type thesis is just the contrapositive of an A-type thesis.  
A popular reason for thinking time is tenseless is that (i) the A-series is essential to time 
because time demands change, and both the B- and C-series without an appeal to the A-series 
do not describe extensive change of the sort required to notice the passage of time. (i) is 
problematic because (ii) the A-series, by itself, is incoherent because it leads to a contradiction 
or circularity. This is because the present moment was future, is now present, and will be past. 
Since these properties are mutually exclusive, in the sense that they cannot be co-instantiated, 
the A-series by itself generates a contradiction. The circularity comes about due to the inter-
definitional nature of mutually exclusive tensed properties and the passage of the present 
moment from one event to the next. The same event cannot have all three tensed properties at 
once, so one must appeal to the B-series, the C-series, or both, in order to make sense of the 
passage of time. So B-theorists will generally accept (ii) and reject (i) on the grounds that a 
single event cannot be past, present, and future at once. An A-theorist will generally accept (i) 
and reject (ii) because one has an intimate sense of epistemic freedom in the present moment 
alone. A B-theorist’s alternative to the tensed view is to reduce all the tensed properties to 
tenseless relations.  As we will see, the best alternative is to analyze the concept of the future 
as being later than the present moment, and the past as being earlier than the present 
moment. This entails that the later-than relation cannot, on pain of circularity, be analyzed in 
terms of tensed properties. This leaves the present moment, and permanent temporal 
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relations, as analytically basic. The next step is to analyze dates in terms of an independent B-
series. This resolution to the tensed tenseless debate is prominently defended by Michael 
Tooley (1997), and supports the GBT of time. The reason why GBT succeeds where others fail 
will be clear after a short discussion about existential expressions. 
Existential expressions 
The appeal of A-type theories of time is probably motivated by what B-theorists would 
call an equivocation inherent in existential expressions in natural languages, like “there is such 
and such” in English. The proposition (Ǝx)Dx “there exists an x such that x is a dinosaur” could 
be interpreted in two radically different ways. A tensed way is to interpret the expression as 
meaning past-(Ǝx)Dx “it was the case there is an x such that Dx.” Because A-theorists need to be 
able to say that dinosaurs are (tenselessly) among real entities (real in the same sense that 
unicorns, which are not among the set of really exiting things, are un-real), the expression is 
qualified in the past tense. It says, at once, that both “it was earlier true that dinosaurs existed” 
and also “dinosaurs are among the things that are real.”  A tenseless way is to interpret the 
expression (Ǝx)Dx as meaning just simply that dinosaurs are among real entities, in the same 
sense of the word real just mentioned. The key part of a tensed interpretation is that one past, 
present, or future tense must be added to specify expressions of the form (Ǝx)Dx – which is 
problematic for reason (ii) in the last paragraph. If the existential expression “there is” should 
be interpreted in a tensed way, then time is tensed because “now” and “past” really refer to 
ontologically distinct realms in which only the appropriate tensed properties obtain. If one 
should interpret existential expression “there is” tenselessly, then time is tenseless because all 
actual events are ontologically on par, despite the apparent passage of time.  
   
11 
 
A tenseless interpretation of existential expressions does not presuppose multiple 
tensed modes of existence like past, present, or future. To say (Ǝx)Tx tenselessly is simply to say 
that, with regard to all necessary facts about all moments, it would be true to say that a 
dinosaur exists at some moment. If all moments partake of an ontologically equivalent mode of 
existence (exist tenselessly), then a B-type theory of time gives the complete story regarding 
what makes propositions about tenseless temporal relations true or false. Let x occur during 
the year 1956 and y occur during the year 1957. The proposition “x is earlier than y” is true 
regardless of the date at which it is uttered; facts about tenseless temporal relations are 
meaningfully true or false both before and after the occurrence of the temporal relata in 
question. This example demonstrates the elegance of B-type theories. One need not analyze 
tenseless temporal relations such as the earlier than relation to give a meaningful story about 
what makes it true that x is always earlier than y. If the B-type theory is complete, then the fact 
that x is earlier than y is true because x occurred and y occurred sometime after that.  
A tensed account of time could try to give a consistent story about what makes the 
truth-values of tensed temporal propositions, of the form Ne, Pe, Fe (meaning event e is Now 
occurring, e occurred in the Past, or e will occur in the Future, respectively), change as time 
passes. Assume e is an instantaneous event that occurs at 2:00. An instantaneous event may 
obtain only one of the three tensed properties of pastness, presentness, or futurity. Based on 
the mutually exclusive definitions of past, present and future, we can attempt to derive some 
consistent truths about the tensed status of e at a given time. Ne and Pe are false, while Fe is 
true, at 1:00. Pe and Fe are false, while Ne is true, at exactly 2:00. Ne and Fe are false, while Pe 
is true, at 3:00. The A-theorist’s move is to make sense of mutually inconsistent tensed 
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properties to the same event by qualifying existential expressions with tensed operators. The 
use of tensed expressions in English is the basis for analyzing the tenseless earlier-than/later-
than relations in terms of tensed properties. Accordingly, we could just as easily say “there 
are/were/will be dinsoaurs later or earlier” as say “there are (tenselessly) dinosaurs,” so why 
not do so? Authur Priori, a prominent Presentist, defends the view that only the present 
moment exists. His strategy is to use a kind of tensed logic in which the logical form of past-
tense propositions includes tensed operators combined with normal tenseless propositions. 
The expressions themselves are interpreted as being explicitly about the present moment. So 
propositions like “there were dinosaurs” have the logical form “past-(Ǝx)Dx – in the past(there 
now exist dinosaurs),” instead of as “(Ǝx)Dx – there are (tenselessly) dinosaurs which is the 
normal logical interpretation of existential expressions. But there are problems with A-theories 
– viz. it may be the case that statements like “I will watch the next Back To The Future Movie in 
the future, after it is made” are true now, but are false later. Suppose I despise Adam Sandler 
movies, and refuse to watch them, but that he is cast in the next Back To The Future Movie. The 
above statement would be both true and false insofar as we think the future tenselessly exists. 
Presentism 
 Presentism is the idea that only the present moment exists; it is the thesis that there is 
exactly one mode of tensed existence in which everything that can occur actually does occur. 
The terms “past” and “future” are vacuous in this view. It is as though the present moment that 
is highlighted by our sentience at any given moment could be represented as the single 
illuminated frame of an infinitely rolling film reel. Only one frame is illuminated at any moment, 
but the projected image changes as subsequent frames are fed through the machine and 
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illuminated one by one. The projected image corresponds to existence as the previous and 
subsequent frames correspond to (tenselessly) non-existent events. The key idea to Presentism 
is that any previous moment that is remembered during the present does not exist; memories 
of past events are said to exist, but those memories necessarily lack concretely realized 
referents. As an event (like lunch time) ends, in terms of Presentism, that event ceases to exist 
and another event (like study time) spontaneously begins to exist, and so on ad infinitum.  
 The problem facing a Presentist is that there are no concretely realized truthmakers for 
facts about events with the properties of pastness or futurity. Presentism is an A-type theory 
that analyzes time in terms of the tensed properties but cannot give a meaningful account of 
truthmakers in terms of the A-series or B-series in pain of circularity. A fatal objection to 
Presentism is that statements like “my birth, in the year 1987, is past at this moment in the year 
2013” are neither true nor false on a Presentist account, which is absurd. In order for a 
statement like this to be either true or false, the referenced truthbearers must actually exist, 
and there must be some concretely realized truthmaker(s) capable of making it true or false. 
Since my birth is not presently occurring, the event does not exist on a Presentist account. Since 
the present year is 2013, based on the mutually exclusive definitions of tensed properties, and 
the assumption that only the present exists, the year 1987 does not exist either. This is absurd 
because it is a necessary fact that I was born in the year 1987, and I have changed since my 
birth insofar as I have gotten older. Presentism cannot give a meaningful account of change 
because to do so would refer to at least two different moments in which the truthbearer in 
question obtains one of two mutually exclusive relations to itself, namely being older or 
younger. So either Presentism cannot account for change, or Presentism cannot give a 
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meaningful account of the relevant truthmakers. Either way the Presentist assumption that 
only the present moment exists leads to an absurd conclusion. 
Eternalism 
 B-type Eternalist theories are tenseless in the sense that, even during the present 
moment, the existences of all moments are ontologically equivalent. The years 2012, 2013, and 
9843 always tenselessly exist. In short, all moments, past, present, and future, would be said to 
exist in exactly the same tenseless mode. It is in virtue of this assumption of tenseless temporal 
relations between all existent events that there are necessary facts about all moments which 
stand in the truthmaker relation to all truthbearers. We can think of Eternalism in terms of the 
infinitely rolling film wheel again. In the case of Eternalism, the currently illuminated frame and 
all previous and subsequent frames correspond to existence. The difference between earlier 
and later moments is that all moments earlier than today are associated with facts that are in 
principle knowable, while all moments later than today are associated with facts that are in 
principle not knowable. In light of a later discussion about precognition, a point should be made 
here about determinism – the idea that all events are predetermined. The epistemic status of 
all later events, or now-future events, depends on the truth or falsity of determinism. If 
determinism is true, then future events are knowable in principle. If determinism is false, then 
future events are in principle unknowable. If an event does not stand in the appropriate 
temporal relations to all other earlier and later events, then that event does not exist. 
 The problem with Eternalism is that the type of causal explanations provided by such B-
type theories do not elegantly account for change, or the perception thereof. According to B-
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type theories, an event X is necessarily temporally connected to another event Y – both before 
and after either X or Y occur. Let X represent facts about the state of a radioactive isotope 
before time t when it emits an alpha particle. Let Y represent facts about the state of the same 
radioactive isotope at time t* after it emits an alpha particle. X involves facts about the mass 
and charge of the isotope which are not exactly the same as those involved with Y. This is 
because alpha decay is a process by which an isotope indeterminably changes states. The key 
point is that the alpha decay between time t and time t* is not entirely causally determined. 
Until that moment, there is a non-zero probability that it will decay and a non-zero probability 
that it will not decay. The release of the alpha particle is underdetermined, both before or after 
time t, though that event is causally determinate at every moment after time t. There are no 
natural facts before time t which necessarily make it true that Y occurs exactly as it does. At 
moments before time t, it is just as likely that Y occurs at t* as it is as likely that Y does not 
occur at t*. B-type theorists have no elegant causal explanation for this kind of event. 
 Similar arguments from indeterminism can made against the B-type theories in terms of 
free will and top-down mental causation. If one freely chooses to execute an action, then that 
action is underdetermined until the moment it is executed. Again, the key point is to not 
confuse the notions of determinability and determinateness. The action is determinate in the 
sense that it is a sufficient condition for some later actions. But it is underdetermined in the 
sense that the action could have happened otherwise, or not at all, insofar as another freely 
executed action could prevent its occurrence. My goal in this section is not to enter in to a 
lengthy discussion of free will, or an interpretation of quantum mechanics, but to give examples 
of events that seem to be underdetermined and determinate. If it seems like freely executed 
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actions or radioactive decay are such events because they could have happened otherwise, 
then there are no facts or concretely realized truthmakers for at least some events of that type. 
Some B-type theorists like David Lewis (1979) have tried to explain underdetermined 
determinate events in terms of separate metaphysically robust realities which enter into 
temporally forward-branching causal relationships at some times but not at others. Such 
explanations are not elegant because they posit the existence of multiple ontologically 
equivalent realities in order to causally explain particular concretely realized events.  
Growing Block Theory 
 GBT is the notion that, at any given moment, all earlier moments tenselessly exist and 
that no later moments yet exist. The term “future” is analyzed as being whatever exists later 
than the present. The present moment is like an infinitely thin hypersurface of reality along 
which new facts are generated and ordered in terms of the C-series. As an underdetermined 
determinate event occurs, the determinate facts about it are added to the sum of all necessary 
facts about reality-simpliciter, and that event becomes concretely realized as a part of 
existence. It would presently be said that all earlier events are like a static block of reality to 
which additional surfaces are constantly being added. The present is the boundary between 
reality and unreality because earlier moments now exist and later moments do not now exist. 
We can think of reality as a rolling film projector in terms of GBT, such that the currently 
illuminated frame has only two real spatial dimensions, all previously illuminated frames exist, 
and subsequently illuminated frames do not exist until they are instantaneously created, fed 
through the machine, and become previously Illuminated frames. Given a causal analysis of 
time, according to which the direction of time is analogous to the direction of causation, if the 
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past had been different then so too the present would have to be different. This is because the 
way the present moment is causally depends on things that happened earlier. But there is no 
temporally opposite counterfactual dependence relating the present to the way the future will 
be. So, whatever happens later than now depends on present and past events, and causal laws. 
 GBT is not subject to the same previously acknowledged criticisms of Presentism or 
Eternalism. GBT explains change by an appeal to facts about the temporal relations between all 
earlier events and spontaneously generated present events. The present events are sometimes 
underdetermined determinate events, like the decay of an isotope. As underdetermined 
determinate events become parts of the history of the world, some particular aspects of reality 
undergo various transformations which are represented as necessary facts. The events 
comprising the history of the world are truthmakers for appropriate truthbearers insofar 
purportedly future events are not appropriate truthbearers.  
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§2 Retrocausation 
Because there is a diverse literature on retrocausation I will begin this section broadly, 
and narrow the focus to one particularly strong argument toward the end. The first pages will 
provide an overview of some simple arguments involving the idea of effects occurring before 
their appropriate causes. The last pages will be an exposition of D.H. Mellor’s time machine 
argument against the possibility of retrocausation. My hope in the first half of this section is to 
provide a brief precursor to the argument in the second half. As Mellor’s argument is among 
the most recent literature on retrocausation, I will begin with the least recent and proceed 
chronologically along the line of arguments until culminating with Mellor’s argument. 
Michael Dummett’s chief retro-dances for earlier bravery 
Serious discussion of retrocausation began with papers written by Michael Dummett 
and Antony Flew for the same symposium entitled Can an Effect Precede its Cause? Both 
authors wrote about strict deterministic (retro)causation of the form “C always causes E” or 
“applying heat to copper always causes it to expand.” This is different than underdetermined 
causation of the form “there is a certain non-zero probability that C causes E” or “there is about 
a fifty percent chance that my flipping a coin will cause it to land heads-up.” Dummett 
advanced the notion that retrocausation is logically possible given the right conditions. Flew 
argued the opposite, citing a contradiction inherent in the notion retrocausation. Dummett 
defends a view that C causes E IFF C’s occurrence is a sufficient condition for E’s occurrence. 
This view is distinct in the sense that events of type C could be both causally sufficient and 
causally necessary for events of type E. If the latter is the case, then events of type E are 
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sufficient, but not causally sufficient for events of type C. The distinction between the terms 
sufficient and causally sufficient is important because one can imagine a world in which an 
earlier event E causally necessitates the bringing about of a later event C, but the occurrence of 
C is itself is causally sufficient to bring about the earlier event E. Likewise, one gets the 
interesting conclusion that if such an earlier event E does not occur, then it will be possible to 
try to cause the later event C, but one would invariably fail because E is a necessary condition of 
C’s later occurrence. A cause is simply the sufficient condition of its effect, regardless of the 
temporal ordering of each occurrence. So there is no contradiction in a cause occurring after its 
effect because the term “cause” is not analyzed as the earlier of two constantly conjoined 
events and the term “effect” is not analyzed as being later than its cause. If an event seems to 
have had no previous or simultaneous causes, why not simply suppose it has not yet occurred? 
Retrocausation is possible if a retrocause is the best explanation of some unknown but 
possible earlier event. Dummett gives an example to illustrate the point (1964, Pg. 349). 
Imagine a shamanic chief who executes the appropriate dances for a brave hunt while the 
hunters of the tribe are away. It takes two days for the hunters to return. The chief’s dancing 
during those two days causes the hunters to have been brave for the hunt. An objection is that 
if the hunters were brave, then if the chief does not dance during those days, the hunters still 
would have been brave. But the chief could respond by saying the propositions “if I dance, then 
they were brave” and “if I do not dance, then they were not brave” are logically compatible 
with the truth of the statement “they were brave.” But then one could argue such a possibility 
is absurd because doing something now in order for something to have happened is identical to 
simply doing something now in order to learn whether or not something had actually 
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happened. This is because the past is fixed; if it had not happened, then one could not possible 
do anything now to ensure that it did happen. If it did, then one could not make it not happen. 
Dummett’s claim is basically that there is no intrinsic temporal asymmetry involved in causality. 
Antony Flew’s world of levers 
Antony Flew argues that retrocausation is impossible because it would entail that it is 
possible to change the past. Since the past cannot be changed, retrocausation is not possible. If 
so, then this is a prima facia reason to think retrocausation is not possible. Flew’s analysis of 
causation imports the notion of irreflexive relations of temporal priority between all causes and 
effects. C causes E if C and E are constantly conjoined, and C occurs before E, while E occurs 
after C. As long as nothing else prevents its effect from occurring, according to Flew, a cause is 
the earlier component of a binary causal process while an effect is the later component. As the 
notion of retrocausation describes an effect E preceding its cause C, and causes always precede 
their effects, retrocausation involves a contradiction in terms – which is absurd. Flew’s account 
holds that the notion of retrocausation represents a conceptual impossibility because an effect 
preceding its cause would be a contradiction in terms.  
Without such a strictly forward-directed analysis of causality, the concept of a cause is 
counterintuitive because once an actual retroeffect would occur the retrocause could not 
possibly be prevented from occurring, or else the retrocause is not a sufficient condition for the 
retroeffect’s occurrence. If a retroeffect does not occur, then it would impossible to do 
anything later so that it does occur because the reason above, and the fact that causality at a 
temporal distance is implausible given the possibility that the interim duration could actually 
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harbor relevant causal factors. This is because once an action is determinate, it would be either 
redundant or fruitless to try to prevent it (1954, Pg. 62). Flew also argues that retrocausation is 
impossible in a deeper way than with the forward-directed analysis of causality. By defending a 
bilking argument of the same sort originally expounded by Max Black. Flew does not consider 
the possibility of the appearance of retrocausation from the perspective of one of many 
oppositely-directed causal processes. If causation is relative to things like reference frames, or 
initial boundary conditions, then there is no intrinsic temporal asymmetry of causality. The 
debate about the intrinsic temporal asymmetry of causation will be further covered in §4. 
Bilking the retrocause like Max Black 
 Max Black (1955-6) argues retrocausation is impossible because one could arrange to 
prevent an allegedly later retrocause of its earlier retroeffect and thereby nullify any notion of 
retrocausal relationships of that type. This is called the bilking argument. If one could not 
prevent the alleged retrocause, then it would seem as though the earlier “retroeffect”, or some 
combination of earlier causes, actually caused the later “retrocause”. The term retrocause 
would be meaninglessly conflated with the term effect in this case because the allegedly later 
retrocause would be identical to an effect of the allegedly earlier retroeffect together with the 
relevant action.  
Consider the case of Zoltar buying a lottery ticket because he has a premonition that the 
winning numbers are XYZ. If his premonition is correct, then there is a causal chain connecting 
the selection of XYZ backward through time to his premonition. The selection of XYZ would be 
the retrocause, and Zoltar’s premonition would be its retroeffect. Now suppose, unknown to 
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Zoltar, the lottery is rigged so that Zoltar’s evil twin can choose the winning numbers before 
they are announced. Zoltar’s evil twin hears Zoltar bragging about his premonition. He decides 
to select ABC in order to prevent Zoltar from winning. Assuming the winning numbers are 
selected, there are two possibilities. Either Zoltar’s evil twin chooses ABC, thereby disproving 
any precognition, or Zoltar’s evil twin is unable to prevent the selection of XYZ. The latter’s 
occurrence could be explainable in terms of a forward causal chain connecting Zoltar’s 
“premonition” to the selection of the winning numbers. Labeling the earlier event as the 
retroeffect would be arbitrary in the same sense that labeling the eating of an omelet as the 
retrocause of a chicken laying the eggs is arbitrary.  
Michael Scriven precognizes the big picture 
Michael Scriven suggested the notion of a kind of retrocausation in which an effect is 
partially determined by later causes and partially determined by earlier causes. This is 
important because it motivated philosophers to acknowledge the possibility of undetermined 
retrocausation. He also described some necessary features of any experiment designed to 
demonstrate an instance of retrocausation. These features are 1) the use of many reproducible 
isolated instances as evidence, 2) the use of statistical inference to conclude any significant 
retrocausal interaction, and 3) the use of rigorous randomization in the employment of 
retrocausal variables as part of the experimental design. 1-3 are important in the next section. 
Scriven’s points are best illustrated by considering the following thought experiment. On 
Monday some experimenters randomly select a sample of people to try to draw a 
representation of a picture that will be randomly selected by experimenters on Tuesday. The 
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pictures, drawn by a random group of people, are the data used as evidence. (1) is satisfied by 
this feature of the experimental design. After the pictures are collected and sealed on Monday, 
experimenters randomly select some picture with the best means of randomization presently 
available. (3) is satisfied by this feature. Then suppose there is a very significant statistical 
correlation between the drawings made by participants on Monday and the picture selected on 
Tuesday. We could then infer, based on statistical analyses of the data, that “there seems to be 
good prima facie reason for saying that the choice on Tuesday determines – to some extent – 
the drawings done on Monday” (1956, Pg. 5). Such a finding would satisfy (2). One could argue 
that some alternative explanations of the data should be considered more palatable. Some 
examples of some relevant competing hypotheses will be discussed in §3. 
D.H. Mellor: from causal loops to Dr. Who’s time machine 
D.H. Mellor gives a two-part argument against the possibility of retrocausation. The 
essential part of a Mellor-style argument is that it depends on a causal analysis of time. The 
direction of time is accordingly analogous to the direction of causation. Let’s say C starts a 
causal process which raises the probability of E’s occurring, given the right necessary 
conditions. If E occurs, then C would be earlier than E, just as E would be later than C. Mellor 
starts by assuming that if retrocausation is possible, then causal loops would exist. His next step 
is to show that the existence of causal loops entails a contradiction. If so, then we have a clear 
refutation of the notion that retrocausation is possible (1998, Pg. 132-5). But there are 
problems with Mellor’s reasoning. Causal loops do not exist if Dr. Who – a fictional character 
who has a time machine – backward time-travels as a ghost, like Ebenezer Scrooge from 
Dickens’s A Christmas Carol, who cannot affect any changes in the outside world around him.  
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If an event C’s occurrence in a loop increases the probability of another event E’s 
occurrence and E’s occurrence increases the probability C’s occurrence, then there is a logically 
independent probability of C occurring and also a probability that is arbitrarily close to 1 that C 
will occur given the fact that C’s occurrence increases the probability of E’s occurrence and vice 
versa. Since the arbitrarily high probability of C’s occurrence is different than the logically 
independent causal probability of C’s occurrence given E’s occurrence, and both causal 
probabilities are entailed by the antecedent occurrence of C, it follows that such a loop could 
not exist. This is because an arbitrary probability of C’s occurring, given the logical 
independence of E’s occurrence, is inconsistent with the antecedent probability of C’s 
occurrence. The thought is basically that, If retrocausation is possible then causal loops are 
possible. Because causal loops are impossible, it follows that retrocausation is not possible.  
D.H. Mellor’s argument on Pg. 135 of Real Time II (1998) 
(1) If it is possible for Dr. Who to time-travel into the past, then it is possible that Dr. 
Who kills his grandmother before she has any children. (Premise) 
(2) If Dr. Who kills his grandmother before she has any children, then it is impossible for 
Dr. Who to time-travel into the past. (Premise) 
(3) If p entails q, then possibly p entails possibly q. (Premise) 
From (2) and (3): 
(4) If it is possible that Dr. Who kills his grandmother before she has any children, then 
it is possibly impossible for Dr. Who to time-travel into the past.  
(5) In S5, if it is possible that it is impossible that p, then it is impossible that p. (Premise) 
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From (4) and (5): 
(6) If it is possible that Dr. Who kills his grandmother before she has any children, then 
it is impossible for Dr. Who to time-travel into the past.  
From (1) and (6), by the transitivity of “If . . . then - - -“: 
(7) If it is possible for Dr. Who to time-travel into the past, then it is impossible for Dr. 
Who to time-travel into the past.  
(8) If it is possible for Dr. Who to time-travel into the past, then it is both possible for Dr. 
Who to time-travel into the past and also impossible for Dr. Who to time-travel into 
the past. 
Therefore, from (8), it is not the case that it is possible for Dr. Who to time-travel into the past.  
Mellor frames his argument in terms of a tenseless theory of time. He is supposed to 
have established the truth of a causal B-type analysis of time in previous chapters. Accordingly, 
the direction of causation in a given region entails the direction of time within that region. We 
are directly acquainted with a series of mental states as we are alive. This is called the causal 
form of inner sense, which is “infallible knowledge of the time order of our own experiences” 
(Mellor, Pg. 115). These mental states have neural correlates which are understood in terms of 
discreet facts about concretely realized events. The exact temporal ordering of events of this 
type subsequently causes the temporal order of mental states to appear ordered as such. An 
example of this could be witnessed by standing near a lightning strike. Almost immediately 
after the strike, one sees a bright flash of light. Shortly after, one hears the crash of thunder. 
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The visual perception is caused almost immediately by light dispersing, exciting the appropriate 
brain areas, and eventually giving rise to mental states associated with seeing lightning. The 
auditory perception is caused later by the subluminal sonic vibrations in a similar manner – the 
only difference being a differently augmented perception brought about slightly later than the 
visual one. In either case, the causal ancestry of the perception of lightning is traceable to one 
and the same strike. If the strike had occurred differently, then the perceptions of it would be 
different. Mellor traces causal ancestry of Dr. Who’s time-travelling journey similarly to a single 
series of events – the outside world. These events include Dr. Who’s birth, his parents’ births, 
and his setting off into the past. Mellor sets out to disprove the possibility of backward time-
travel by suggesting that there is a single basic universe-wide direction of time. He then points 
out the contradiction arising from one’s not noticing the causal difference between the private 
direction of time inside the time machine, and the general direction of time outside it.  
Here are my thoughts about the argument. The argument is committed to the position 
that the direction of time is analogous to the direction of causation. Because the argument 
depends on a causal analysis, the two oppositely-directed causal processes (viz. Dr. Who, and 
the outside world) actually represent two unique opposite directions of time. The argument 
would not prove the point intended to be proven by Mellor if Dr. Who is just always travelling 
backward through time relative to the outside world because his causal ancestry would not 
counterfactually depend on the history of the world. The contradiction only arises because 
Mellor, who defends a B-theory of time, does not acknowledge this difference between two 
oppositely directed causal processes. He calls the scenario an instance of retrocausation 
because the time of Dr. Who’s grandmother’s birth would be both earlier and later than the 
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moment Dr. Who begins travelling backward in time from Dr. Who’s reference frame. But 
retrocausation is not the same thing as the past once being one way, and then another. In 
terms of the growing block theory, as described in §1, which accounts for underdetermined 
determinate events, an instance of retrocausation is the determination of a past event by a 
present event. This is so because moments later than the present do not tenselessly exist. 
If backward time travel is possible, then it seems like is instance of retrocausation, but 
only in terms of B-theories of time. The argument is valid if (1) and (2) are true. But there are 
some reasons to think (1) or (2) are false. Mellor’s formulation of the argument interprets “If p 
then q” as a strict implication rather than as a material conditional. This means the sentence “If 
p then q” is being read as “p entails q.” The premises I have labeled (1), if it is possible for Dr. 
Who to time-travel into the past, then it is possible that Dr. Who kills his grandmother before 
she has any children, and (2), if Dr. Who kills his grandmother before she has any children, then 
it is impossible for Dr. Who to time-travel into the past, do not sit well with the idea that Dr. 
Who’s future is analogous to Dr. Who’s grandmother’s past and vice versa.  
Consider the case of Dr. Who not being able to affect any changes in the world around 
him after he steps outside the time machine during the time of his grandmother’s infancy. The 
time machine could be such that anybody who steps into it permanently becomes an 
immaterial mind and backward time-travels as a passive perceiver, but is unable to change the 
history of the world. Dr. Who’s experience would be like watching an extremely realistic movie 
of the history of the world in reverse. If that is the case, then (1) is false. Mellor could reply by 
saying that Dr. Who would have to be able to at least raise the probability of the past changing. 
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In such a case, there would have to be bi-directional causation between the two processes. But 
if the past can change like that, then the past could change only so much that (2) is false.  
Namely, it could be the case that Dr. Who is actually able to kill his grandmother and 
also that she is resurrected through human cloning and is then able to act as the precursor of 
Dr. Who’s causal ancestry. The objection is that insofar as Dr. Who’s time-travelling can change 
the past, it is possible that the past changes just enough so that story does not entail a 
contradiction. This would be a reason to think (2) is false. Again, it is only because Mellor does 
not properly distinguish between the nuances of two oppositely directed causal processes that 
a contradiction arises. In short, if (1) Is false, then (2) is vacuous. If (1) is true, then (2) is false. 
Because it is possible to imagine that Dr. Who has no causal efficacy over the past, or has just 
enough so the story is consistent, the argument is invalid. So Mellor’s argument against the 
possibility of retrocausation fails to prove the intended point for the reasons above. 
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§3 Precognition 
This section begins with a discussion about the possibility of supporting a hypothesis of 
precognition via some recent bilk-proof experiments. I am going to conclude by considering the 
relevance of the nature of time to precognition. Some clarification of relevant terms is in order 
before the discussion gets underway. A precognition, E, about a later event, C, is an example of 
retrocausation in terms of a tenseless view of time. This is because a later event, C, somehow r-
causes an earlier precognition, E, it must happen in a way similar to which an earlier event 
causes a later memory of that event. It is a simple fact of human cognition that a phenomenon 
that depends on some appropriate things being consciously represented. Before something, the 
blueness of an object for example, can be cognized, a conscious representation of blueness 
must be caused by way of the brain processes that are correlated with consciousness. It is only 
after the brain processes occur that one can have an experience of the blue variety.  
Overview 
As noted in the previous section, in Randomness and the Causal Order, Michael Scriven 
set out some design features for precognition experiments. These features are 1) the use of 
many reproducible isolated instances as evidence; 2) the use of statistical inference to conclude 
any significant retrocausal interaction; and 3) the use of rigorous randomization in the 
employment of retrocausal variables as part of the experimental design (1956, Pg. 8-9). (1) is 
supposed to ensure the generality of causal explanations predicted by the theory being tested. 
If I ran the experiment I would want other researchers to reproduce my design and find similar 
data because that would mean the theories on which I base my explanations apply to their data 
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as well. If other people run the experiment and find significantly different data, then those 
instances would be evidence that some relevant theories are falsified and my findings are false-
positive statistical artifacts. (2) is basically standard practice in the social sciences like 
psychology. The thought is that the sample (smaller group of people) from which data is 
collected must be representative of the population (all people). Tests of statistical significance 
weigh the likelihood that the data supports general explanations in terms of a theory. (3) is 
important to precognition experiments because if a later r-cause C is a sensory stimulus truly 
chosen at random, then it would be impossible to do anything before C is chosen to prevent it 
from being chosen and bilk the alleged r-causal relationship. As Max Black pointed out, in Why 
Cannot an Effect Precede Its Cause”, r-causes may be bilked (1956, Pg. 54). If one thinks 
precognition E was caused by a future event C, and prevents E’s occurrence after C occurs, then 
C does not cause E and C is not a precognition. But it seems to me that even the ability to 
prevent C, even if one does not actually do so, is enough to show that C is not the cause of E. 
Psi-research and methodological practices 
Some recent examples of precognition experiments, which fulfill the above criteria, have 
been published in by Daryl Bem’s article entitled Feeling The Future. Bem concluded that 
precognition is the best explanation of the data and published his findings in the Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology (2011). His paper discusses a few alternative explanatory 
hypotheses. Nine experiments involving over one thousand participants are reported in Bem’s 
paper. The experiments are easily run on a home computer, and software packages for each 
experiment were made available online so anybody with a computer could replicate the 
experiments. For these reasons, (1) is satisfied by Bem’s experiments.  
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Etienne Lebel and Kurt Peters, in Fearing the Future of Empirical Psychology, give a 
critique of Bem’s research practices in terms of method-relevant beliefs and theory-relevant 
beliefs. Standard modal research practice MRP is “the accepted methodology empirical 
psychologists most commonly use in their research” (2011, 371). MRP is determined by 
method-relevant beliefs held by experimenters. Accordingly, tests of statistical significance are 
used to interpret the data gathered from all of Bem’s experiments. There are various types of 
analyses, of various degrees of rigor, used to infer correlations, explain data in causal terms, 
and make novel predictions. Bem’s chosen data analyses are one sided t-tests used to compare 
participants’ hit rates (operationally defined as the percentage of “precognitions” out of all 
trials) – which ranged from about 
%51-53 overall, with the 
likelihood of obtaining the same 
data given random chance alone – 
which is estimated as %50. The participants did better than chance on a few trials out of every 
hundred. This data is statistically significant in terms of MRP, because of the large sample size, 
and because the reported p-values are lower than the chosen alpha-levels. P-values express the 
probabilities of obtaining the data given the truth of a null hypothesis or negation of the 
hypothesis of question. A lower p-value means it is more likely that the data is “significantly” 
different than chance given a correct rejection of the null hypothesis. Statistical significance is a 
technical term used to researchers to assess whether observations represent a correlated 
pattern of states of affairs rather than would obtain by chance. The significance of p-values is 
interpreted entirely in terms of researchers’ chosen alpha-level. The alpha-level of a statistical 
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analysis indicates the probability that the observations represent false-positive correlations. 
Alpha-levels are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, by researchers, to provide an indication of 
significance. Standard MRP allows a 0.05 alpha-level to be used to determine significance. This 
could mean that five out of one hundred articles reporting correlations as “significant at a 0.05 
alpha-level” are false-positives. Some of Bem’s colleagues ran alternative analyses of the 
reported data with different methods and found fewer significant differences between the 
participants’ performances and chance. Their approach will be discussed in a later paragraph of 
this section. (2) is met by these experiments. 
In order to prevent bilking in these experiments, Bem designed the programs to 
randomly select stimuli C only a few milliseconds after participants made response choices E. 
Some versions of these precognition experiments used computer software to randomly select 
the stimuli. Others used a hardware based random number generator that randomly selects 
stimuli based on radioactive decay or diode noise. Hardware based random number generators 
are indeterminate in the quantum mechanical sense, and select stimuli more randomly than 
software based random number generators because they are determined by physical processes 
rather than pre-programmed algorithms. The use of hardware based random number 
generators was made by the one experiment which was not later reanalyzed and found not 
significant. The experiment in question will now be explained in greater detail. (3) is fulfilled by 
Bem’s experiments. 
Imagine you are taking part in the following experiment. In front of you is a computer 
screen depicting two closed curtains. You are asked to select one of the two curtains to be 
opened in order to look at a picture behind it. The computer will randomly select a pleasant 
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picture to be displayed behind one curtain and an unpleasant picture to be displayed behind 
the other. Only after you have chosen which one to look behind will the picture placement be 
randomly selected. You cannot possibly know what will be behind either curtain because there 
will be nothing behind either curtain until after you choose which one to look behind according 
to a growing block theory of time. This is because the present moment does not have the same 
ontological status as the future placement of pictures behind either curtain. Accordingly, 
propositions about the placement of the pictures behind either curtain are neither true nor 
false.  
Some alternative explanations of the data 
Assume you are somehow able to select the curtain behind which a pleasant picture will 
be displayed significantly more than you would by chance alone. Bem suggests we may explain 
this tendency in terms of one of four competing hypotheses (2011, pg. 410).  
(A)  Precognition /retrocausation: You somehow have cognitive access to information 
about future events that are not yet determined; the causal relationship between 
stimulus and cognition is reversed. 
(B)  Clairvoyance: You somehow have access to already determined information “in real 
time”, information that is stored in the computer. 
(C) Psychokinesis: You are somehow influencing the random number generator’s 
placement of target pictures by the choices you make. 
(D)  Artifactual correlation: The output from the random number generator is 
inadequately randomized, containing patterns that fortuitously match your response 
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biases. This produces some spurious correlation between your guesses and the 
computer’s placements of the target pictures. 
A reason might be offered for thinking the clairvoyance hypothesis (B) best explains the 
data depends on the computer implicitly “knowing” what will be displayed based on the 
algorithm used by the software-based random number generator. The thought is that if the 
participants are not demonstrating precognition because the causal arrow between the 
computer’s “knowing” what will be selected and what participants select extends in the 
forward direction only, then the computer’s “knowing” what will be selected causally 
determines participants’ choices. The problem with this hypothesis is that if the random 
number generator involves any sufficiently challenging level of calculation, then even if 
somebody could clairvoyantly learn the complete state that the computer was in at the 
moment they were about to choose a curtain, as humans they would not have the sufficient 
arithmetical ability to perform the appropriate calculation, and thus determine which curtain 
would have a pleasant picture behind it.  
A reason might be offered for thinking the psychokinesis hypothesis (C) explains the 
data is that participants are able to exert an influence on the hardware-based random number 
generators in such a way as to determine the positions of pictures before they are displayed. In 
such a case participants would mistakenly believe they perceive the placement of the pictures 
when in reality they are causally predetermining the placement of the pictures by some sort of 
esoteric mental powers. This explanation is ruled out by the fact that software-based random 
number generators were used to obtain similar data to that obtained by hardware-based 
random number generators and the picture placement is implicitly determined by the 
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algorithms inherent in the computer’s programming language. Additionally, even if humans had 
psychokinetic powers, given that one would lack detailed information about states of the 
computer’s circuitry, one could not even know what one had to affect. So, for these reasons, 
we can reject (C). 
Bem cites two reasons for thinking (A) the precognition hypothesis is favorable to (D) 
the artifactual correlation hypothesis (2011, Pg. 411). The first is that pleasant pictures were 
detected significantly more frequently than randomly interspersed unpleasant pictures, and 
that unpleasant pictures were not detected significantly more frequently than chance. The 
second is that a virtual control experiment using random inputs instead of inputs by human 
participants yielded null results – meaning that the truth of (D) a hypothesis that the output 
from the random number generator is inadequately randomized, and that there is some 
spurious correlation between participants’ guesses and the computer’s placements of the 
target pictures, is significantly unlikely. Philosophical considerations aside, Bem concludes that 
(A) is the best of these four causal explanations of the data. 
If it can be shown that (D) is in fact a favorable hypothesis to (A) in terms of Bem’s 
research and MRP, then Bem’s conclusion goes wrong, not only for philosophical reasons, but 
also because of methodological problems reflecting general deficiencies in MRP not addressed 
by Scriven’s criteria. And that is just what some of Bem’s colleagues set out to do (LeBel & 
Peters, 2011; Wagenmakers, et. al, 2011).  
A critique of Bem’s methods 
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In addition to these arguments, an epistemological concern surrounds the issue. It 
seems foolish to approach a controversial topic with certainty, especially in a case such as this 
one, in which there is little to no agreement among experts. This is because, as we have just 
seen, the statistical evidence may be interpreted in terms of the antecedent probabilities of the 
truths of many competing hypotheses – P(H), evidence given the hypothesis in question – 
P(E|H), and the antecedent probability of the 
evidence in question – P(E). Because research-
relevant beliefs determine at least some of 
these values, some prefer Bayesian data 
analyses. If, for example, one hypothesis is more or less likely than another regardless of the 
probability of obtaining the evidence, then the data may need to be analyzed differently 
because that hypothesis is antecedently less likely than others. This means if Bem’s 
precognition hypothesis (A) is less probable, or the observed regularities are less likely to be 
reported by a different sample of participants, then Bem’s data should be analyzed differently. 
Bayesian t-tests can provide a much different, more conservative, data analysis (Wagenmakers, 
et. al., 2011). The one-sided t-tests used by Bem provide illusory evidence for an inference 
supporting (A), which leads to the possibility of a researcher’s bias interfering with an objective 
interpretation of evidence in related experiments (Francis, 2012, Pg. 3). Because a researcher’s 
expectations are shaped by theory-relevant beliefs about the theoretical constructs that 
produce behavior, and method-relevant beliefs about the production, measurement, and 
analysis of data, Bem’s study may be interpreted as theory relevant or method relevant (LeBel 
& Peters, 2011, Pg. 372). Theory-relevant beliefs are those inferred beliefs held by a researcher 
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about the theoretical mechanisms, or constructs, which produce behavior. An example would 
be the belief that precognition is possible, or the belief that precognition is not possible. 
Method-relevant beliefs are those beliefs held by a researcher about the procedures through 
which inferential information is gathered, measured, and analyzed. It is due to the certainty 
with which Bem makes unusual conclusions, the relatively liberal nature of Bem’s data analyses, 
and skepticism about the behavioral constructs explained by (A), that the lesson to be learned 
from these experiments is about MRP instead of about precognition. 
Three direct criticisms of Bem’s publication are (X) it overemphasizes conceptual rather 
than close replication, (Y) it pays insufficient attention to verifying the soundness of 
measurement and experimental procedures, and (Z) it is flawed in its implementation of null 
hypothesis significance testing (LeBel & Peters, 2011). The nine experiments reported by Bem 
are purportedly conceptual replications of the same type. Bem is interested in measuring the 
data in terms of a theoretical construct called “psi-phenomena” which is explained by reversing 
the temporal order of colloquially correlated stimuli and response variables and then searching 
for significantly different data than would be expected given the truth of a null hypothesis. 
There are four types of correlations which are accordingly reversed in these experiments – 
approach or avoidance to pleasant/unpleasant images, priming, habituation, and recall. A null 
hypothesis is the negation of the hypothesis that is tested. Hypothesis 1, for example, is that 
participants detect stimulus details before being presented with a stimulus more than they 
would by chance. The null hypothesis would then be that participants do not detect stimulus 
details before being presented with a stimulus more than they would be chance.  
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(X) and (Y) are criticisms of construct validity in this experiment. It is possible that the 
data could explain other theoretical constructs, such as clairvoyance, psychokinesis, as would 
be explained by Bem’s competing hypotheses (2) and (3). An overemphasis of conceptual 
replication comes about because of too much ambiguity in interpreting the constructs in 
question. Subliminal priming, as a colloquially accepted construct, has been closely replicated 
so many times that there is very little ambiguity in the interpretation of experiments about it. 
Bem’s choice of constructs, however, is more like searching for a correlation between spousal 
love and bravery and then explaining the data by claiming something like “if spouses are braver, 
they love each other more.” (X) means these constructs are not adequately operationalized in 
Bem’s study. 
(Z) is problematic in this case for two reasons. First, the standard null hypothesis of no 
difference will almost always be false when the alpha-level is .05. A lower alpha-level would 
yield a statistically insignificant result. Second, it divorces theory choice from the context of the 
broader scientific knowledge system. This encourages a short-sighted interpretation of the data 
that could result in bizarre conclusions about what has been empirically demonstrated (LeBel, 
& Peters, 2011, Pg. 374). Without accounting for the antecedent probabilities of the truths of 
hypotheses in question, there is a five percent chance that any randomly chosen false 
hypothesis seems significantly different than the null hypothesis. The problem is compounded 
because hypothesis testing can be done ad-hoc. This is called data mining. If, for example, an 
initially chosen hypothesis test is not statistically significant, then the researchers can continue 
modifying their hypothesis tests until rejecting a null hypothesis. When a data analysis does not 
yield the results an experimenter expects, there is no need to report those findings in a 
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publication. Bem’s publication, for example, could exclude dozens of insignificant hypothesis 
tests. The results could be atypical correlations. For these reasons, and because of controversial 
nature of the hypotheses in question, Bem’s study should be interpreted in terms of method-
relevant beliefs rather than theory-relevant beliefs. The structure, rather than the content, of 
these or any other experiments conforming to standard MRP is what needs to be revised, as do 
MRP themselves. 
Thoughts from the future? 
This section has so far considered a direct refutation of an example of some bilk-proof 
empirical experiments about precognition. The authors cited so far are mostly concerned with 
whether precognition is empirically impossible in the context of bilk-proof experiments. The 
difference between Bem’s experiments and precognition in a natural context is that in nature 
something could occur before the precognized event that would prevent the event in question 
from occurring as precognized. In such a case, the “precognition” would simply be a false belief.  
I will now broaden the scope of interest to include reasons to think precognition is 
logically impossible. Recall in §1 the arguments against presentism and B-theories of time. 
Open future theory is the correct theory of time because it is not susceptible to the same 
refutations leveled against the other two. Precognition is only possible given the truth of a B-
theory of time, because the B-theory is true IFF the future events in question always exist. 
Future events do not exist in terms of open-future theory or presentism. Somebody who 
coincidentally predicts a later event might later think they had precognized the event if they 
think that future events exist in the same way that past or present events do. But, as §1 set out 
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to prove, B-theories of time do not accurately describe the world we live in, in which bilking is 
possible. The non-existence of future events means precognition is logically impossible. 
I am assuming a necessary condition for human cognition is that the cognized events in 
question must be constantly causally connected to the cognition by representational memories. 
Because there are no representational memories that are continuously causally connected to 
future events in the same way that representational memories are continuously causally 
connected to past events (viz. as neural connection), precognitive knowledge of future events, 
should it exist, would be very different than memories of past events. This is because 
representational memories are neurally encoded by past events and stored in one’s skull. 
Unlike the latter, precognition would have to involve some type of causal action at a distance. 
One might object, however, that there is such a continuous process, in that if a person 
believes at a certain time, t, that event E is going to take place at a later time, t*, then that 
person will also believe at times intermediate between t and t* that event E is going to take 
place. But there are at least four objections to the claim. One is that it is the belief at time t that 
event E is going to take place that causes later beliefs that event E is going to take place, rather 
than the other way around – which would have to be the case for precognition to be like 
memory. Second, in the case of memory, there tends to be a gradual degradation of the 
information encoded in memories as one moves from the past event closer to the present. A 
parallel degradation of encoded information is not present in alleged cases of precognition as 
one traces the causal process running from the future event back toward present cognitions. 
Third, something might happen later than t, but before event E occurs at t*, that wipes away 
the belief about the occurrence of event E. Fourth, even if the belief is not completely wiped 
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away, as would be the case in the previous reply, there could be a spatial gap at the time of 
event E between that event and the precognizer. Even if there is no temporal gap, there is a 
spatial gap – which is not present in other cases of causation in the actual world. So it seems 
like human precognition is very unlikely to occur in the actual world because of the contingent 
nature of human cognition – viz. the structure of brains, and relations of cognition to memory. 
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§4 Causal Asymmetry 
The previous three sections have been concerned with an analysis of time, the concept 
of retrocausation, and experiments about precognition, respectively. This section is distinct in 
the sense that physics, as an enterprise of natural science, presents a different problem to be 
addressed when approaching retrocausation. Physics, as does any natural science, is supposed 
to causally explain phenomena in terms that are as observer-transparent as possible. These 
terms are different than those used to discuss the topics of the previous three sections because 
if inanimate objects are involved in retrocausal processes, then the observer’s trying to cause 
something is irrelevant to the temporal order of causality. Such is not strictly the case in the 
thought experiments discussed by Dummett and others in §2, nor is it the case in the 
precognition experiments described in §3. Also, the arguments for the different analyses of 
time depend on one’s having experiences with the apparent passage of the present moment in 
one direction only, or trace memories of earlier events, while objective causal asymmetry, and 
causal/temporal order, is by definition independent of one’s own experiences.  
Background 
The possibility of retrocausation, of the sort described by Mellor, in physics depends on 
the lack of an objective causal asymmetry.  The natural sciences assume the asymmetry of 
causation, in terms boundary conditions or some natural law, in order to explain asymmetric 
correlations between most observed patterns of states of affairs. But philosophers of physics, 
like J. J. C. Smart, claim that the laws of physics are temporally symmetric, in the sense that “the 
laws of classical dynamics and electromagnetism, as well as of quantum mechanics, are all 
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expressed by the time-symmetrical differential equations. In other words, if f(t) is a solution to 
these equations, so is f(-t)” (2006, 468). This is a puzzle because the objective microphysical 
direction of causation, and hence of time, does not seem the same as the objective 
macrophysical direction of causation. A successful refutation of Dummett’s case of 
retrocausation being possible, given the right conditions, depends on there being an objective 
temporal ordering of microphysical causal processes – which are themselves temporally 
symmetric. Contemporary physics infers such an objective temporal ordering based on the 
causal asymmetry of macrophysical processes, such as the rotation of clock hands. The case of 
retrocausation in physics is anomalous because alleged instances of retrocausation may be 
interpreted differently depending on one’s interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
Uncertainty and retrocausation 
Albert Einstein, et. al., in Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be 
Considered Complete?, argues that the probabilistic predictions of the spatial locations of 
photons given by the wave function in quantum mechanics do not describe reality completely 
because the position of photons cannot be predicted with certainty without disturbing the 
system (1935, Pg. 777-80). Because two photons cannot be completely described as having 
simultaneous reality, and the descriptive wave function assumed in quantum mechanics does 
describe two distinct photons as having a simultaneous reality, it follows that such a description 
is not complete. It is the uncertainty of the trajectory and position of a photon in a closed 
system that is at issue. Roderick Sutherland, in Causally Symmetric Bohm Model, claims that it is 
sound to argue that “a particle always has a definite, but hidden, trajectory” (2006, Pg. 2). This 
means the position of a photon at a given time makes it the case that at an earlier time the 
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photon was not at certain locations. According to one interpretation of this paradigm, later 
states of affairs called final boundary conditions seem to causally determine the earlier 
positions of radiating photons in a field, such that the final boundary conditions consist of a 
state of affairs that will occur temporally later than the causally contiguous relations between 
the described elections and the assumed final boundary conditions of the system. As we saw in 
§1, this makes no sense in terms of GBT. If this type of phenomenon exists, then it seems like 
we have an example of an effect temporally preceding its cause. It is the uncertainty of the 
trajectories of photons in fields that gives rise to hypotheses that describe photons in terms of 
retrocausation. The fact that the equations used to describe electromagnetic radiation can be 
run in parallel with an inverted time-sense complicates matters because it may be a contingent 
fact that energy disperses due to thermodynamic disequilibrium. The anomaly arises due to 
controversy between conflicting interpretations of electromagnetic radiation. A different 
paradigmatic interpretation of the wavelike eigenfunction used to describe the uncertain 
superposition of photons inside interacting electromagnetic fields could explain the anomaly. 
David Lewis and the asymmetry of causation 
We can formulate causal explanations in terms of sufficient conditions and laws of 
nature like this “A is a determinant of B, if A is minimally sufficient for B, given the laws of 
nature. An example is “the application of heat to copper is a determinant of the expansion of 
the copper, if the application of heat is minimally sufficient for the expansion of the copper, 
given the laws of nature.” Take note that the overdetermination of a cause by its effects is 
implicit in this type of explanation. A presumably precedes B both causally and temporally such 
that there are more relevant effects than there are causes associated with A. The effects of 
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causal processes started by A are spread out in a forward direction through both time and 
space, in the sense that the case of outgoing spherical wavefronts is potentially the cause of 
many other effects. It is the case in our world that the laws of thermodynamics, which are 
interpreted with an assumption of the completeness of Maxwell’s equations, coupled with the 
instantiation of A, give rise to causal processes which span time and bring about many other 
patterns of events. 
 A causal process started by A is said to have fork-like causal asymmetry in the sense 
that these patterns of events would make the shape of a branching tree if plotted along a three 
dimensional axis where the passage of time is plotted as one of the axes and the coarse spatial 
locations separating those patterns are plotted along the other two. The asymmetry of 
causation is explained by Lewis by the fact of causal overdetermination – viz. observed events 
have many more future causal traces than past causal traces. As Lewis puts it, “whatever goes 
on leaves widespread and varied traces at future times. Most of these traces are so minute or 
so dispersed or so complicated that no human detective could ever read them; but no matter, 
so long as they exist” (1986, Pg. 50). Take for example the case of tossing a large stone in to the 
middle of a still circular pond. First you observe the stone displacing a small amount of water 
shortly after it makes contact with the surface of the pond. The displaced water molecules 
subsequently displace many more nearby water molecules, and so on, until the entire surface 
of the pond is oscillating with outgoing concentric waves. If those waves are strong enough to 
reach the banks of the pond, then those banks act as a boundary across which the waves do not 
cross. It is because the stone’s earlier displacement of a relatively small amount of water is a 
sufficient condition for the later displacement of a much larger amount of water across the 
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entire surface of the pond, given the laws of fluid dynamics and so on, that the cause has many 
more effects than the relevant effects have causes. If a hula hoop had been thrown around the 
perimeter of the pond instead of a stone in the center, the subsequent causal process would 
not have occurred in the form outgoing concentric waves, but as incoming converging waves. 
Lewis claims the asymmetry of overdetermination entails the temporal asymmetry of 
microphysical causation because, though some microphysical processes are causally symmetric, 
the asymmetry of overdetermination is extremely skewed such that for every moment, t, there 
is an earlier moment, t*, during which fewer common causes occur than do causally related 
effects at t. It is not the case that we see the reversed order of these events occurring naturally 
in our world – incoming concentric waves converging on a common center area which gains 
enough potential energy for a large rock to jump out of the center of a pond, the surface of 
which then becomes still, for example. So it is safe to assume that all of nature is shot through 
with one temporally asymmetric forward branching fork of causation – i.e. capable of bringing 
about extrinsic atemporal change of the sort described by Shoemaker in §1. The asymmetry of 
causal overdetermination which seems metaphysically inherent in the actual world entails that 
microphysical causal processes are intrinsically asymmetric in the sense that the observed 
position of a photon at a given time entails that it could not possible be at some places during 
earlier moments. Building on Lewis’ thoughts, if this is the case, then retrocausation is 
impossible because of some law-like fact about reality. The puzzle of incompleteness in physics 
may be solved once this fact is properly explained. If collapsing a waveform actually creates 
reality, then it seems like retrocausation is possible because there is no intrinsic asymmetry. 
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From causal overdetermination to causal asymmetry 
The thought on the table is that there is an intrinsically asymmetric temporal difference 
between the cause and the effect for all physical processes of both micro- and macro-physical 
objects regardless of the uncertainty involved in predicting their spatial properties. Jan Faye 
gives a reason to think the incompleteness involved in a physical theory that describes 
particulars in terms of a wave function leads to interpretations according to which there is no 
intrinsic temporal difference between cause and effect. If there is an intrinsic difference, then 
“if there are processes in the world that might be seen as a manifestation of backward 
causation, these are not to be depicted by a description that leaves them to be time-reversed 
cases of ordinary forward causal processes” (Faye, 2010, sec. 4.4.2). The latter consequent is 
false in terms of some branches of modern physics, so the question arises as to how we are to 
make sense of the causal symmetry used to describe fundamental physical processes, given the 
incompleteness of a waveform as the description of a single particular. If the best theories 
predict an effect preceding its cause, which is possible, then either there needs to be a better 
theory, or there is no intrinsic asymmetry of causation. The jump from counterfactual reasoning 
to causal asymmetry would appear suspect if counterfactual reasoning is somehow mistaken. 
To recap, fundamental physical processes, like electromagnetic radiation, are causally 
symmetric in the sense that the same equations used to describe the outward radiation of 
particles can be used to describe the inward convergence of particles given different boundary 
conditions. If so, later states seem to affect earlier ones. This is a puzzle for physicists because, 
given a causal analysis of time, the difference between advanced and retarded waves is also a 
difference between temporal orders. The following is an attempt at distinguishing between 
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forward and backward causal processes according to a time-symmetric description of 
microphysics. 
It is possible to simply assume that there is such an intrinsic difference between forward 
and backward causal processes, which is a similar point to the one made by Flew in §2. If causes 
are temporally unidirectional levers which bring about later effects, and it is not possible to 
observe an effect preceding its cause, or an effect that is simultaneous with its cause, then 
there is probably an objective metaphysical asymmetry of causation. One can do this, argues 
Faye, by making some other basic assumptions about the nature of reality (2010, sec. 4.4.2).  
(i) Process tokens and process types are distinct in the sense that only process 
types are reversible; process tokens are not. 
Types are to tokens as words are to this word on the page. Recall what happens when 
you toss a large stone in to the center of a still pond. The observed outward motion of 
concentric waves is of one type. The inward motion of concentric waves would be of a different 
type. If the motion of retarded waves is temporally reversed, then they are called advanced 
waves and vice versa. If you toss a big hula hoop in to a still pond, an inward motion of 
concentric waves within the hoop would be observed. The two types of waves just described 
obey the same laws of physics regardless of their manner. The waves themselves are tokens of 
one type or the other, but not both. You will not toss the stone and observe, for example, 
waves begin moving outward from the center, and then stop before reaching the banks of the 
pond only to reconverge back in the center. From this, it follows that the dispersion of energy 
from a relatively high potential state to a relatively low potential state is not reversible. 
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However someone who believes time is symmetric might argue that the only solution to the 
question of how the two processes differ appeals to the idea that they are oppositely directed. 
(ii) A normal observer will describe causal processes propagating forward in time in 
terms of positive mass and positive energy states pointing into her future 
whereas she will describe the same tokens in terms of negative mass and energy 
states point into her past. 
The opposite would only be observed in extremely rare cases in which retarded waves 
do not exist, or in which both advanced and retarded waves exist. It is for this reason, and 
because the laws of nature in the actual world are immutable, that Lewis claims the 
overdetermination of causation entails the temporal asymmetry of causation. (ii) is reflected by 
Lewis’ earlier claim that whatever goes on leaves widespread and varied traces at future times 
but has a smaller number of root causes in the past. It is the existence of forward-branching 
causal traces between a few past tokens and many more later tokens that allows the natural 
sciences to give causal explanations of the sort mentioned previously. 
(iii) One must distinguish between a passive time reversal operation and an active 
time reversal operation. 
Because the microscopic dynamics of particles and fields is temporally reversible, in the 
sense that their descriptive equations of particle motion can be run in parallel with respect to 
an inversion of temporal variables, it is reasonable to assume there is a difference between 
what Faye calls passive and active time reversal operations. “The passive transformation is 
applied to the same process token by describing it in terms of the opposite coordinates and 
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opposite energy states. The active transformation, by contrast, brings about another token of 
the same process type in virtue of some physical translation or rotation of the system itself, 
both tokens having the same energy sign point in the same direction of time” (2010, sec. 4.4.2). 
(iii) is the assumption that there is a fundamental difference between describing particle 
motion in terms of time-invariant equations and initiating a retrocausal processes. 
(iv) The description in terms of positive mass and positive energy flow corresponds 
to the intrinsic order of the propagation. 
This is basically the claim that there is an asymmetry of causation that underwrites the 
temporal ordering of events. Another way of thinking about (iv) is Flew’s analysis of causation 
where causes are temporally unidirectional levers which bring about their results. The 
asymmetry described by (iv) is supervenient upon all particular instances of causal relations 
between events. When describing the earlier conditions of the universe, the initial boundary 
conditions corresponding to lower entropy, coupled with the intrinsic asymmetric order of 
causality, explain the later facts. This is the assumption required of Lewis’ account that 
overdetermination entails asymmetry. It is the same assumption Huw Price tries to refute. 
Huw Price’s reply 
The premise that universal overdetermination entails universal causal asymmetry is one 
that Price finds questionable. His thought is essentially that we cannot infer that the same type 
of causal overdetermination we observe as deliberative cognizers applies to the whole of 
reality. If his argument succeeds, then assumption (iv) is not true. In a universe which has 
reached thermodynamic equilibrium, inwardly converging advanced waves would occur as 
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commonly as outwardly radiating retarded waves – at a frequency of about once every billion 
years (1992, Pg. 504-5). Such would be a case of describing backward causation in terms of 
time-reversed cases of ordinary forward causal processes. The existence of advanced waves in 
our universe, or of temporally backward travelling advanced matter, would have far-reaching 
consequences for the enterprise of natural science. This is because causal overdetermination at 
the smallest descriptive levels of reality has consequences for almost all other descriptive levels 
of reality. If this is true of the world, then it is a contingent fact about our universe that 
overdeterimination is asymmetric. It is possible to imagine, for example, a world divided in to 
two causally isolated halves such that counterfactual dependence seems asymmetric toward 
the future for people living in one half, but counterfactual dependence seems asymmetric 
toward the past to the other half. The memories of people from one half would all be described 
as being about the future by people from the other half and vice versa. Say they could look 
through a window and see what is going on in the other half. They would see clouds of smoke 
form over piles of ashes, and then begin funneling down in to cold black flames which would 
subsequently un-burn a pile of hot logs into existence, and so on. Some causal processes would 
seem reversed while others follow what one calls the natural order of time. This is an 
extraordinary case, but an important one because it is apparently consistent with some later 
states of affairs in our universe given our contemporary descriptions of the laws of nature. 
The following is Price’s line of argument about the contingent nature of causal 
asymmetry. Thermodynamic disequilibrium explains an earlier state of conditions that must 
have been true of our universe at earlier moments. Disequilibrium makes electromagnetic 
radiation appear temporally asymmetric in nature - “the asymmetry depends on the fact that 
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we have big disturbances (such as flying stones, or a positive charge) in the initial conditions but 
not in the final condition” (1992, Pg. 505). For this reason, we must consider boundary 
conditions and their relation to thermodynamics. In the case of retarded electromagnetic 
radiation, the dispersion of energy from a relatively high potential energy emitter is considered 
an initial condition. The absorption of energy by a receiver, or the direct measurement of a 
photon, is called a final condition. Boundary conditions, such as relatively low levels of entropy 
of our universe at moments in the distant past, and relatively high levels of entropy far off in to 
the future, are important because they are needed in order to explain the fact that observed 
causal asymmetries are now extremely skewed in only one temporal direction, branching out 
with the future, rather than bidirectionally or converging toward a single event at some later 
time. So Price’s argument shows that causal asymmetry is a contingent fact about our universe. 
Price’s causal subjectivism 
 Price’s further treatment of causal asymmetry is subjectivist in the sense that there is no 
objective causal asymmetry independent of deliberations made to ensure survival. A reason to 
reject the thesis that causal asymmetry is an objective feature of nature is that “it reduces to 
something very much like Hume’s view in the case of microscopic and substatistical systems 
[viz. electromagnetic radiation], where the causal asymmetry becomes nothing more than a 
conventional label, applied to mark alignment with a macroscopic statistical asymmetry” (Price 
& Weslake, 2009, Pg. 36). If so, causal relationships are simply artifacts of our ways of cognition.  
Price’s argument builds on the fact that we are essentially deliberative creatures whose 
survival depends on one’s executing actions in order to bring about relevant outcomes. Human 
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beings naturally infer causal relationships between a specific action, A, we believe to be able to 
do, or not do, and the observed outcome, O, which seems to temporally follow the action. 
“Interpreted in material terms, what we believe is simply that the disjunction ~A V O is true. 
Moreover, we believe it inferentially, as we might say – i.e. not simply in virtue of already 
believing one or the other disjunct is true” (2009, Pg. 27).  Because of the temporal asymmetry 
between actions and their outcomes, the perception of causal relationships seems asymmetric 
to us, even though they are simply ordered by convention.  
A reply to Price 
There is a counterexample to Price’s argument found in some cognitive science research 
done by Lau, et. al. Researchers used transcranial magnetic stimulation [TMS] to test the time 
needed for the perceived onset of motor intention to be fully determined. This is basically a 
process of temporarily damaging key brain areas like the presupplementary motor area in living 
humans and then performing experiments about the experienced onset of intention after 
action execution. After the relevant sections of their brains were rendered non-functional, 
participants were asked to execute simple motor actions and then report their perceptions of 
the times at which they intended to execute the actions. TMS conditions shifted participants’ 
perceived onset of action intention backward in time and the perceived timing of the actions 
forward in time relative to control conditions. “The data suggest that the perceived onset of 
intention depends at least in part on neural activity that takes place after the execution of 
action, which could not, in principle, have any causal impact on the action itself” (2007, Pg. 9).  
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Unless a retrocausal explanation of the data is assumed from the start, the actions one 
attributes to some of one’s own executive functions are at least partially determined before it is 
possible for one to have the experience of intending to act deliberatively. So, the causal 
relations between one’s actions and one’s experienced onset of intention follow an objective 
temporal order. The spontaneous action is the cause; the data and relevant brain activity 
associated with one’s experience of the intention to act are the effects. We here have a clear 
example of the objectivity of causal asymmetry independent of deliberative actions in this case. 
So it seems like Price’s causal subjectivism does not succeed in explaining causal asymmetry. 
Thoughts about a bizarre universe 
It is possible to imagine a bizarre universe different than ours in one important way –
only advanced waves exist, and retarded waves do not exist in the bizarre universe. At an 
earlier time, the bizarre universe would have high entropy, and then later it would have low 
entropy. If people living in our universe could somehow observe, but not causally determine, 
what goes on in the bizarre universe, our universe’s laws of electrodynamics would describe 
inward converging concentric waves meeting upon a common center spatial region which 
would subsequently gain energy. Insofar as the initial and final boundary conditions of the 
bizarre universe are basically like ours but switched, similar types of things would happen but 
they would be manifest in a reversed order. Later events would counterfactually depend on 
earlier causes, but it would be impossible to discover the roots of such counterfactual 
dependence until they happen at some later time relative to our time sense. The thought 
experiment is designed to show that, even though Price’s causal subjectivism has flaws, the 
current paradigms of physics do not explain why it must be the case that there is an objective 
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asymmetry of causation independent of the fact that only retarded waves seem to exist in our 
universe. We could interpret the fact as good evidence that advanced waves do not exist, but 
to do so would be a matter contingent on some objective asymmetry of causation which 
underwrites disequilibrium – which would be circular reasoning. 
The key point of a bizarre universe thought experiment is that the overdetermination of 
causation could run in the same temporal direction, but the asymmetry of causation could run 
in the opposite temporal direction as in our universe. We could just as well think of the initial 
high entropy condition, and the causal processes by which the flow of energy is transformed, as 
earlier events. The final low entropy condition, and the higher energy of the center region, 
would be later events. The term “smoking gun” is not sufficient to describe the causal ancestry 
of the bizarre universe, a more fitting term would be “smoking guns” because of the correlation 
among remote causes all seeming to conspire to bring about one and only one common effect. 
This may seem unlikely because everything in our universe seems to stem from one common 
cause, but it is possible. Because it is possible to imagine a bizarre universe, the claim that 
causal overdetermination entails the asymmetry of causation seems suspicious. Physicists need 
to first demonstrate the objectivity of causal asymmetry, and then explain anomalies like the 
behavior of particles in electromagnetic fields, in terms of that asymmetry to safely assume (iv). 
Final thoughts 
The possible existence of a bizarre universe is highly improbable given the causal 
ancestry of our universe because the history of our universe is causal asymmetric – there are 
more later causal traces than earlier causal traces. It shows that boundary conditions are not 
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the only reason to think time is asymmetric. If there is an objective causal asymmetry, as Flew 
claims in §2, then retrocausation is impossible because there is some law-like fact about the 
universe which entails that causes precede their effects. If not, then retrocausation is possible.  
Consider the case of two oppositely directed intrinsically asymmetric causal processes, Ψ and Ω 
such that there are only one-way causal interactions running between the two – running from 
Ω to Ψ. From the perspective of Ψ, the effects of causes occurring in Ω would appear to 
manifest in the reversed order, even though the same would be true of Ω if the extensive 
ineffectiveness was switched so that Ψ affects Ω but not vice versa. Such would be the case of 
an effect preceding its cause. It may be objected that there is no such atemporal reference 
frame in which Ψ and Ω could interact as such. But insofar as there is objective causal 
asymmetry and an incomplete description of causally symmetric processes, there is no reason 
to posit some extra fact about reality that makes the opposite true. The following figure 
illustrates how causality in Ω would seem to somebody living in Ψ. 
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The first section supports the claim that Growing Block Theory is a consistent causal 
analysis of time which describes change, truthmakers, and underdetermined determinate 
events more completely than alternative theories. From this we get the idea that the present is 
whatever is earlier than the future. The present is also later than, and counterfactually 
dependent on, past events. The next section focused on D.H. Mellor’s argument from causal 
loops against retrocausation. Mellor’s argument is that if retrocausation is possible, then causal 
loops would exist. Causal loops do not exist because the contrary position leads to an absurdity. 
From this it follows that retrocausation is not possible. But the example of Ebenezer Scrooge, 
who backward time-travels but cannot affect the past world around him, is a refutation of the 
premise that if retrocausation is possible, then causal loops exist. Scrooge would be initiating a 
private retrocausal process, relative to the outside world, by backward time-travelling as a 
ghost. The counterexample is no more incredible than the case of backward time-travelling, so 
Mellor’s argument does not succeed in proving the point intended. The next section was about 
Bem’s precognition experiments and reasons why precognition of the sort proposed by Bem is 
logically impossible. These reasons depend on the notions of counterfactual dependence, 
bilking, and the analysis of time covered in previous sections. The final section was about the 
asymmetry of causation and retrocausation in terms of current physics paradigms. The 
asymmetry of causation is a contingent fact of reality that is logically independent of the 
deliberative nature of human cognition. A possible picture of retrocausation emerges, 
according to which earlier states of causal processes are determined by later states of a causal 
process relative to observations made in terms of an oppositely directed causal process. From 
this it follows that the possibility of retrocausation is not an incoherent notion. 
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